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Abstract 
Investments in human capital can create a hold-up problem whereby both employers 
and employees exploit the bargaining weaknesses of the other.  Employee share 
ownership (ESO) can mitigate this hold-up problem because it can align interests, 
develop loyalty, signal good-will, and lock-in employees.  Previous studies have shown 
positive relationships between company investments in human capital and the use of 
ESO consistent with this argument but have been unable to identify the direction of 
causality. Using panel data from the French REPONSE survey, the findings indicate 
that significant and continuous investments in human capital take place prior to the 
implementation of ESO.   
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Introduction 
Recent research within the financial participation literature has highlighted 
complementarities between employee share ownership plans and employer-provided 
training (Robinson and Zhang, 2005).  The primary argument underpinning this 
complementarity is that share ownership provides bonding mechanisms for both 
employer and employee, thereby constraining the training risks borne by each party.    
On the one hand, employers bear the risk that investments in training will be wasted by 
a failure of employees to engage or commit.  In the worst case employees leave the 
firm, possibly to capitalize on the investments made by the employer.  Where training 
takes a strong firm-specific form, employees may exploit the dependence of the firm on 
their skills to extract rents from the employer.  On the other hand, employees bear the 
risk that the firm will expropriate the returns to the skills and competences that result 
from training.   The proposition in the recent literature is that employee share ownership 
plans can mitigate these problems.   
 At a broader level, this complementarity may be located in the evolution of modern 
capitalism.  It has been argued that long-term growth in employee share ownership 
schemes, observed in many advanced industrial nations, is related to the growth in 
importance of intangible human capital relative to tangible physical capital in the 
modern company (Rousseau and Shperling, 2003).  Human capital cannot be tied to 
particular firms in the same way as physical capital, and getting human capital to work 
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effectively is more challenging than managing physical assets.    These challenges have 
been highlighted by the resource-based view of the firm, emphasising the role of 
valuable, scarce, and inimitable resources in achieving competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991).  At the same time, some accounts have highlighted the challenges to securing 
employee commitment and human capital investments arising from employment 
insecurity (Blair, 1995; Rousseau and Shperling, 2003).  Why should employees 
commit their human capital, and the development of it, to the firm, when the firm is 
unwilling to reciprocate?  Blair has argued that employee ownership is a means of 
resolving this dilemma by giving employees return and governance rights within the 
firm.    
Consistent with these perspectives, a several recent papers have found positive and 
significant correlations between employee share ownership and employer-provided 
training (Pendleton and Robinson, 2011; Robinson and Zhang, 2005).  Other papers 
have found employee share ownership has effects which are conducive to training, such 
as lower labour turnover (Fakhfakh, 2004; Sengupta et al, 2007).  By and large, this 
research has assumed that there is a sequential and temporal dimension to 
complementarity between training investments and employee share ownership plans but 
this has not been well-developed in the work published to date.  An important part of 
the problem is that these papers are mainly based on cross-sectional data with the  result 
that it is difficult to determine the timing of these initiatives and to evaluate the 
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direction of causality, if any, between the two. Which comes first: employee share 
ownership or training initiatives, or are they adopted simultaneously? Identification of 
the temporal relationship between share ownership plans and training will enhance our 
understanding of the nature of the posited complementarity between these two human 
resource management activities. 
This paper is able to address this question by exploiting the panel element of the French 
workplace employment relations survey REPONSE.   This survey, which is nationally 
representative of French establishments, is conducted periodically by DARES (the 
research arm of the Ministry of Labour): we use the panel element of the 1998 and 2004 
surveys.  As in other European countries, employee share ownership has been growing 
in France in recent years: we observe a near tripling of the use of plans in the six years 
after 1998.  This means that there is a relatively large group of adopters within the 
sample, thereby facilitating analysis of the relationship between training and the 
introduction of employee share ownership plans.   A novelty of the French context is 
that all companies with 20 or more employees are required to spend at least 1.5 per cent 
of their annual pay-bill on training, though not all companies do so.  Many firms spend 
above this legal minimum and our interest is whether variations in training expenditure 
above this minimum are associated with the use of and adoption of employee share 
ownership plans.  Our analysis focuses on listed companies because, as has been found 
elsewhere (Pendleton et al., 2001), share ownership plans are mainly found in this type 
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of company.  As in other studies, we first mount a cross-sectional analysis to identify 
the strength of associations between levels of training and the presence of a share 
ownership plan in 2004.  We then refine this by inserting training data from 1998 into 
the 2004 cross-section.  Finally, we utilise training data from both 1998 and 2004 to 
determine whether training has any association with the adoption of share ownership 
between 1998 and 2004.  Our results are consistent with studies conducted elsewhere 
(eg. in Britain), but also provide some novel findings that advance our knowledge of the 
relationship between training and financial participation.  In our presence models there 
are statistically significant associations between high levels of training and employee 
share ownership plans in 2004.  We find much stronger relationships between high 
levels of training in 1998 and the presence of share ownership in 2004, thereby 
suggesting that a high commitment to training leads to the use of employee share 
ownership plans. Then, a set of adoption models shows associations between high levels 
of training in 1998 and subsequent adoption of employee share ownership, though only 
if high levels of training are maintained after 1998.  Where high levels of training 
decline after 1998 the relationship with ESO adoption is insignificant suggesting that, 
where firms do not maintain training investments, the need to adopt share ownership 
plans no longer arises.     
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By highlighting the potential sequencing of training and share ownership plans, this 
research adds to our understanding of this particular form of complementarity.  It 
provides further evidence that employee share ownership plans are conducive to 
training, and more importantly provides some empirical support for the proposition that 
share ownership plans are used in response to training investments.  The paper adds to 
the very small segment of the financial participation literature which focuses on factors 
determining the adoption (rather than presence) of financial participation and, in an 
advance on this previous literature (eg. Kruse, 1993), shows that certain human resource 
practices (training) are associated with the probability of adopting financial 
participation. More generally, the results provide support for the view, still rarely tested, 
that the adoption of complementary human resource and high involvement work 
practices occur in a piecemeal and sequential fashion (Pil and Macduffie 1996).  They 
are consistent with the implications from resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) and from theories of ownership (Grossman and Hart, 1986) that sharing 
ownership and access to control can mitigate resource dependencies and efficiency 
losses where there are asset specificities.  The paper suggests that there are (mutual) 
benefits to be gained from the reallocation of some residual rights to employees to 
overcome potential opportunism.  
The article is organized as follows.  The next section considers theory and evidence in 
the literature on human capital, and highlights the potential role of employee share 
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ownership in dealing with the hold-up problem that can arise from  investments in 
human capital.  This section develops the hypotheses used to guide the empirical study.  
The following section describes the sample, variable construction, and methodology.  
This is followed by a presentation of the results.  The final section concludes by 
considering the implications of the findings for the literature, and discusses limitations 
and possibilities for future research.   
 
 
Theoretical background and literature review 
A challenge for firms is to acquire and utilize valuable, scarce and inimitable resources 
in order to obtain a sustained competitive advantage over competitors (Barney, 1991). 
These resources include assets, capabilities, organizational processes, information, and 
knowledge that enable firms to develop and implement strategies that improve firm 
performance. These various resources that can be classified in three categories (Barney, 
1991): physical capital resources (Williamson, 1975), human capital resources (Becker, 
1964), and organizational capital resources (Tomer, 1987). In this article we focus on 
human capital, defined as ‘the knowledge, information, ideas, skills, and health of 
individuals’ (Becker, 1964). Human capital has become an important source of 
corporate success as the business environment has become more and more competitive 
(Hitt et al., 2001). A variety of human resources practices to manage this human capital, 
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identified by Huselid (1995) as ‘High Performance Work Systems’, consistently present 
a positive relationship with firm performance, as demonstrated in a large number of 
empirical studies (Combs et al., 2006).  An important element of this is that firms 
should invest in training and retain employees if they are to enhance their stock of 
human capital. Indeed, an important issue for firms is to control critical resources upon 
which it has come to depend (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Compared to other types of 
resources (financial capital, physical capital), the peculiarity of human capital of course 
is that it is inseparable from employees.  This confers greater risk for the employer: if an 
employee leaves the firm, they take with them their knowledge, ideas, and skills.  As a 
result, investments by employers in developing these skills and knowledge may be 
wasted. It is even more problematic because ‘an individual possesses his (sic) 
knowledge in a direct and absolute manner. He is the sole arbiter of its use by others’ 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 46).  
 
Other theoretical perspectives, such as transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979) 
also highlight the vulnerability of the firm to its human capital.  Investments in training 
are at the heart of a potential ‘hold-up’ problem for both the firm and its employees 
(Ben-Ner et al., 2000; Blair, 1995), since either party may expropriate from the other 
their share of the surplus stemming from these investments. On the one hand, workers 
bear the risk that the employer tries to capture all the rents generated from investments 
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in firm-specific skills (that have little or no value for employees outside of the firm).  
Even investments in general skills may give rise to employer opportunism because 
employers often finance general skills development, with general skills often having a 
quasi-firm-specific character because of the verification costs facing alternative 
employers (Katz and Ziderman, 1990; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998).  On the other 
hand, employers take the risk that employees do not use the acquired skills to create a 
competitive advantage for the benefit of the firm, or else bargain for rents based on the 
costs of substituting them by new employees.  Expenses incurred in providing training 
by the firm do not then generate returns on the investment. Either party may exploit the 
bargaining weakness of the other to secure returns at the expense of the other.  This 
hold-up problem arises not only where skills are firm-specific but also where they have 
a more general character because general skills can be quasi-firm-specific due to the 
costs for new firms of evaluating workers’ skills.   
 
It is therefore necessary to have mechanisms to manage the risk of hold-up and promote 
the development of a long-term employment relationship so that investments in training 
bear fruit. This can mitigate the problem of the control of human capital as a critical 
resource. One solution could be to write contracts that define precisely the investment of 
employers and employees along with the distribution of rents resulting from training. 
However, the writing, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of such contracts 
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are likely to be expensive (Williamson, 1979). Moreover, there is nearly always 
contractual incompleteness in the employer-employee relationship. Many details of the 
job to be carried out are left to the employer discretion.  In other words, the employer 
has many of the residual rights of control (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Because of 
employee risk aversion arising from the hold-up problem, the employer may have to 
hand over some control to employees in order that they acquire and use new skills. This 
can be done by giving employees some ownership rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986) by, 
for instance, introducing employee share ownership (ESO).  ESO can help to mitigate 
employer and employee opportunism by making employees residual claimants (Blair, 
1995). If the employees are shareholders, they have some rights of control that can limit 
employer opportunism, and rights to residual income. Based on Grossman and Hart’s 
(1986) analysis of costs and benefits of ownership, the positive effects of ESO on 
employees’ attitudes and behaviours -including fidelity- are greater than the adverse 
consequences for managers of the loss of residual rights of control. ESO adoption can 
therefore be seen as a means for the firm to preserve critical resources in order to avoid 
uncertainty and to reduce its vulnerability (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
 
The employee share ownership plans that we focus on in the paper are typically open to 
all or most employees, though actual participation rates may be lower, and generally 
make available to employees a small proportion of the company’s equity (typically 1-5 
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per cent).  They provide participating employees with return rights (dividends and 
capital gains) and some control and information rights.  Given that employees between 
them secure a small minority share, the control rights are usually fairly limited in 
practice.  The loss of residual control to other owners (and managers)    from sharing 
residual rights is therefore a limited cost in any evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
sharing ownership (Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
 
A recent paper in this journal identified two specific sets of benefits of employee share 
ownership (Pendleton and Robinson, 2011).  Although these benefits are not unique to 
employee share plans, these authors argued that in combination they provide strong 
support for and reinforcement of firm-provided training.  The two benefits are the 
creation of an identity of interests between employee and employer, and a mechanism 
that locks-in employees and provides benefits that tend to rise with job tenure.       
 
The posited identity of interests has both governance and psychological dimensions, 
with the latter of greater importance.  Focusing on governance first, employee owners in 
France have the same rights of information and the same rights of expression as the 
other shareholders. They are thus members of the annual general meeting, have the right 
to ask questions to the management (although this is rare in practice, even when the 
employee shareholders are grouped in an association), and have a right to vote on 
13 
 
company resolutions. Furthermore, according to French legislation, employees have the 
right to elect a representative to the board of directors when they hold more than 3 
percent of the capital of the company (see Ginglinger et al., 2011).  A further specific 
governance right in French company law is the requirement that changes to the capital 
base of a listed company (ie further share offers) must be accompanied by a proposal to 
shareholders at a general meeting that employees be included in the share offer 
(‘augmentation de capital réservée aux salariés’). In our sample 59 per cent of those 
responding to a question on the nature of the share plan indicated that shares had been 
passed to employees by this means.   A further legal requirement in France is that every 
three years in companies where employees hold less than 3 per cent of the company’s 
shares, the general meeting of shareholders must consider a proposal that company 
shares should be allocated to employees joining the company savings plan (PEE).    
However, it is important to note that these legal requirements do not mandate share 
ownership plans, merely that the shareholders must periodically consider the 
introduction or extension of employee share ownership.  Thus, employee share 
ownership plans, and the control and information rights associated with them, are 
entirely voluntary.   
 
The psychological dimension is the potential for employee share ownership to support 
favourable employee attitudes to the firm, such as high commitment, engagement, and 
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citizenship behaviour.  A rich stream of research on share ownership and employee 
attitudes over many years has shown that ESO can generate intrinsic satisfaction from 
owning shares (Pendleton et al., 1998), extrinsic satisfaction from the financial benefits 
it conveys (Buchko, 1993; French and Rosenstein, 1984), and instrumental satisfaction 
based on involvement in decision-making (Long, 1980).  Under certain conditions, 
workers with ownership may experience psychological ownership (Pierce et al., 1993). 
In addition to the many empirical studies that have highlighted attitudinal effects of 
employee share ownership, Caramelli and Briole (2007) explore the theoretical 
foundations of these effects and conceptualize the ways in which employee ownership 
may affect work satisfaction, work motivation, and affective commitment. These 
authors suggest that French legislation on ESO favours the development of a 
‘consciousness of being stockholder’ which in turn may have a positive effect on 
affective organizational development.  
 
The other main benefit of employee share ownership plans identified in the recent 
literature is ‘lock-in’.  By helping firms to retain employees, ESO may limit the 
potential for the benefits of training to be dissipated by employee exits (Rousseau and 
Shperling, 2003).  Share ownership plans typically embody both formal lock-in 
requirements and also provide incentives to remain in employment with the firm.  For 
example, French legislation requires that free allocations of shares cannot be sold by 
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employees for four years, and, as is common in other countries, employees are required 
to retain shares in the company plan for a minimum period for the tax benefits to be 
secured.  REPONSE data indicates employee investment in company shares comes 
about through the Plan d’Epargne d’Entreprise (PEE) in 55 per cent of cases: French 
law requires that profit share awards made into the PEE (the typical source of 
contributions to the PEE) must be retained within the plan for five years to secure 
income tax and social security benefits.  In the literature, the ‘lock-in’ outcomes of ESO 
are demonstrated by empirical studies which show that employee share ownership 
reduces turnover (Buchko, 1993; Sengupta et al., 2007; Wilson and Peel, 1991).   
 
On the basis of these arguments, it is proposed that employee share ownership is 
conducive to the provision of training by companies.  It can do so by encouraging an 
identity of interests which reduces employee propensity to hold-up the employer 
through exploiting its scarce skills, and by providing protections for employees against 
employer expropriation of rents.  The lock-in characteristics of employee share plans 
further encourage employees to commit to the firm.  So far, the empirical evidence is 
consistent with this posited complementarity.  Some recent studies from Britain have 
found significant statistical associations between the use of employee share ownership 
and relatively high levels of training (Pendleton and Robinson, 2011; Robinson and 
Zhang, 2005).  There is also some US evidence, albeit not consistently strong, that 
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specificity of human capital is associated with a high probability of ESOP presence 
(Ben-ner et al., 2000).   
 
Unfortunately, a weakness of these studies, as indeed of most studies of complementary 
HR practices, is that their empirical basis is cross-sectional: they record use of ESO and 
high levels of training at a particular moment in time.  As a result, we gain few insights 
into how this complementarity develops over time.  An important question is which 
comes first – ESO or high levels of training – or are both adopted simultaneously?  An 
answer to this question potentially provides important insights into how ESO may 
resolve the hold-up problem identified earlier.       
 
There is no clear theoretical basis for predicting precise time lags between 
implementing training programmes and introducing employee share ownership plans (or 
vice versa), reflecting a broader problem in assessing causality in management research 
(Mitchell and James, 2001).  Nor, to the best of our knowledge, is there any empirical 
work on this issue.  Indeed, there is very little empirical work on the wider issue of the 
phasing of HR innovations, since nearly all research in this area takes a cross-sectional 
form.  The same is broadly true of evaluations of the effectiveness of human resource 
and high involvement work practices (Wall and Wood, 2005).  However, as argued by 
Pil and Macduffie (1996), some theoretical guidance on the phasing of change can be 
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derived from evolutionary economics.  This literature suggests that organisations make 
significant and comprehensive changes to their routines infrequently, with most changes 
typically taking an incremental form (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Organisational 
changes are often introduced in a ‘trial and error’ way, and with experimentation 
hampered by inertia and reluctance to change organisational routines.  Organisations 
rarely adopt comprehensive and simultaneous introduction of a range of new work or 
HR practices, and the adoption of new practices will depend on the perceived 
performance of past practices.  
 
It seems likely that high levels of training will precede the adoption of employee share 
ownership plans because, where used, training will be seen as directly necessary for 
more or less immediate operational and business success whereas the anticipated 
benefits of ESO are less tangible.  Managers typically highlight the potential effects of 
ESO on commitment, identity with the firm, and a sense of involvement as reasons for 
introducing schemes (Poole, 1988).  Furthermore, enhancing training may be viewed as 
an incremental change to existing work practices whereas introduction of a share 
scheme is a more ‘revolutionary’ change since it changes the distribution of residual 
control and income rights within the firm.  In the French case, it is mandatory that firms 
with more than 20 employees spend at least 1.5 per cent of their pay-bill on training.  
Spending in excess of this, and at higher levels than the norm, will typically involve 
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incremental changes to existing practices.  By contrast, the introduction of employee 
share ownership plans has substantial and time-consuming additional administrative 
requirements which place considerable demands on existing routines.  These include the 
need to secure shareholder approval, the issue of communications to employees, the 
acquisition or issue of shares, the establishment of legally-mandated holding bodies 
such as trusts.  Prior to this there is usually extensive deliberation within companies as 
to whether these direct costs can be justified by the apparently intangible intermediate 
benefits, such as enhanced employee commitment.  The implications of these 
differences between training expenditure and the introduction of ESO is that the former 
is easier to implement first, and that there may be a substantial time lag between 
initially incurring high levels of training expenditure (and discovering threats to the 
effectiveness of this) and the implementation of ESO.           
 
Hypotheses 
Investments in training, whether for specific skills or general skills, are a potential  
source of a competitive advantage for the firm but need to be protected. But they are at 
the heart of a hold-up problem, since the employer as well as the employees can try to 
capture the rents resulting from training. If each is afraid that the other will 
opportunistically expropriate all of the gains of training, the risk is that neither the 
employer nor the employees will invest in training. ESO is a way to mitigate this risk of 
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hold-up, by passing control and return rights to employees, by aligning employees' 
interests with those of the firm, and by promoting a long-term employment relationship.  
At the same time, it protects the employer in the ways outlined earlier.  On this basis, 
and in line with the argumentation in the preceding section, we propose Hypothesis 1.  
This proposes a simultaneous complementarity between share ownership plans and 
relatively high training investments, and replicates the proposition found in the recent 
literature referred to.     
Hypothesis 1: Relatively high investments in training are associated with the use 
of employee share ownership. 
 
The implementation of an employee share-ownership plan is an expensive process. The 
firm has to define the characteristics of the plan, choose the fund manager, negotiate 
with union representatives, introduce the project in the annual general meeting, 
communicate to the employees, etc. ESO also generates legal obligations that managers 
may perceive as constraints: the right to information of employee shareholders, the right 
to participate in general meetings, the right to vote, the obligation for the managers to 
convene a general meeting every three years in order to present a project of capital 
increase reserved for the employees if they do not already own 3 percent of the share 
capital of the firm, presence of employee shareholder representatives on the board if 
they have more than 3 percent of the share capital, etc. Despite a favourable fiscal 
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framework, these constraints are brakes on the implementation of an employee share 
ownership plan.  Based on evolutionary theory, ESO plans require a major change to 
organisational routines and practices, and thus take some time to be implemented 
(Nelson and Winter, 1972).  And, as argued by Grossman and Hart (1986), passing 
ownership to other parties can ensure that they engage in the relationship, but the loss of 
residual rights of control generates constraints for the first party. The problem is that the 
benefits can be intangible and hard to measure (eg. diffuse feelings of identification 
with the firm), so managers are likely to be cautious in adopting ESO as a means of 
protecting investments in human capital development.   They also have to evaluate the 
effectiveness of training investments before implementing an employee share ownership 
plan.  The obstacles to training effectiveness, and potential hold-up problems, are also 
likely to emerge slowly.   Thus, ESO is likely to be adopted some time after the 
allocation of substantial resources to training.  On this basis we propose Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2: ESO is adopted following significant investments in training. 
 
 
Methodology and data 
Data 
We use data from versions of the French REPONSE (Relations Professionnelles et 
Négociations d’Entreprise) survey, conducted in 1998 and 2004 by the research centre 
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of the French Ministry of Labour (DARES).  This is a nationally representative 
establishment-level survey with many similarities to the British Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey (WERS).  The employment and workplace issues covered are very 
similar: labour organization, establishment changes, job management, worker 
involvement, pay systems, and conflicts (Conway et al., 2008). Like WERS, REPONSE 
includes questions on training and on employee share ownership.  We primarily use the 
element of the 2004 cross-section that forms a panel with a sub-section of the 1998 
survey.  Our choice of 1998 and 2004 as our points of observation is obviously 
determined by data availability and the question arises as to whether 6 years is an 
appropriate gap between the two sets of observations given the hypotheses to be tested.  
There is no clear theoretical guidance from the literature but, as outlined earlier, the 
extent of the procedures required to implement ESO, coupled with existing knowledge 
about evolutionary change, suggests that it is not too long a gap.  If it is too short, this is 
likely to be reflected in insignificant results in our adoption models.  The only other 
study that considers sequential use and introduction of high involvement work practices 
also utilises a similar gap (five years) between observation points (Pil and Macduffie, 
1996).      
 
The 2004 sample includes 2930 private sector establishments of 20 workers, excluding 
the agricultural sector. To test the hypotheses outlined above, we limit our sample to 
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listed company establishments that are in REPONSE in 1998 and 2004.  The rationale 
for this is that, as elsewhere, employee share ownership is highly concentrated in the 
listed company sector.  The benefit of using the panel within REPONSE is, as Kruse 
puts it, ‘compared with cross-sectional data, the use of panel data to examine the 
adoption decision can [...] provide heightened confidence about the relationship and 
causality’ (1996: 533). Company establishments whose employees are the primary class 
of shareholders, as in workers’ co-operatives, and those where a small number of 
employees are significant shareholders, as often occurs in LBOs, are removed from the 
sample because these types of ownership are distinct from typical all-employee share 
ownership plans.  The final sample size is 195.  Our analysis first uses the 2004 panel 
element of the cross-section, and then incorporates variables from 1998.  Whilst this 
analysis focuses on the use of employee share ownership plans, in the latter stages we 
exploit the panel dimension to investigate the adoption of share ownership plans.  
Before doing this we provide further information on our variables.  
 
Employee share ownership variable 
The main question in REPONSE asks whether employees hold shares in the company. 
As workers’ co-operatives and companies where a small number of employees are 
significant shareholders (eg. as in leveraged buy-outs) are removed from the sample, 
and as stock options are excluded from consideration, we can be confident that the ESO 
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variable is consistent with the definition of employee share ownership of the French 
Commercial Code.  Comparison of the two data points reveals strong growth in ESO 
between 1998 and 2004.  In 1998 13 per cent of establishments report having ESO (n = 
25/195).  By 2004 35 per cent (n = 69) of establishments have some of the company 
owned by employees.  From these two variables (ESO 1998 and ESO 2004), three 
others were built to observe: 1) the absence of ESO in 1998 and in 2004, 2) the presence 
of ESO in 1998 and in 2004, 3) the implementation of ESO between 1998 and 2004. 
More than 22 per cent of establishments implemented ESO between 1998 and 2004, 
whilst 65 per cent remain without ESO in 2004. 
 
Human capital variables 
The investments in human capital are measured first of all by the amount of the 
spending of training for 1998 and 2004. There is a six-category question, with each 
category corresponding to an amount of training expenses (expressed as a percentage of 
the establishment payroll). The median category of training expenses is then calculated 
for each business sector in 1998 and 2004.  The training expenses of each establishment 
are then compared against this sector median to estimate its relative level of investment 
in human capital. New variables were constructed to show the evolution of this relative 
level of investment in human capital across both years. Every establishment has training 
expenses that are either: lower than the median in 1998 and in 2004 (44 per cent), lower 
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than the median in 1998 but higher in 2004 (16 per cent), higher than the median in 
1998 and in 2004 (26 per cent), or higher than the median in 2004 but lower in 1998 (15 
per cent). Another measure of the range of human capital is a variable that measures 
how long it takes for a new employee to do his job as well as an established employee.  
This four category variable is converted into three dummies for the regression analysis.  
These variables provide a measure of training needs, and may also be seen as a proxy 
for firm-specific skills.   
 
Control variables 
The use of ESO is potentially also influenced by other factors (Kruse, 1996; Pendleton, 
1997; Kruse et al., 2010) that must be controlled for in our analysis. ESO is frequently 
associated with high performance work and employment practices (Addison and 
Belfield, 2000; McNabb and Whitfield, 1998). Dummies for the presence of quality 
circles, briefing groups, regular meetings with employees, sharing the business project 
with employees, job autonomy, and profit sharing plans are included. Workforce 
controls are included in order to control for the presence of temporary employment, the 
percentage of fixed-term employees, the level of qualification, and the presence of 
union representatives.  Finally, there are a set of controls for employment numbers and 
the characteristics of the establishment: dummies record the independence of the 
establishment, the multi-site localisation, the fact to face strong competition, and others 
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are included for the different industries. Appendix 1 describes the variables and 
provides descriptive statistics. 
 
In the first step we use probit regression models to estimate the probability of various 
factors being associated with the presence of ESO in 2004. A second step analyses the 
lagged effects of 1998 training expenses on the use of ESO in 2004. Finally, the third 
step is to estimate the effects of movements in training expenses between 1998 and 
2004 on the probability of ESO being introduced between these dates.  For this third 
step we use a reduced sample of firms that did not have ESO in 1998, and then 
undertake an adoption model (Kruse, 1996). 
 
 
Results 
Table 1 reports the estimates of the first six models.  Varying measures of company 
investments in human capital are used in these models.  Models 1 and 2 use a set of 
dummies that records training expenses relative to payroll expenditure, Model 3 uses 
the relative level of investment in human capital, and Model 4 uses dummies to record 
the typical time taken for employees to acquire the skills necessary to be effective.  
Models 5 and 6 add this time to the amount of training expenses and to the relative level 
of investments in human capital respectively.  The baseline model (Model 1) shows that 
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training expenses above 3.1 per cent of payroll (at least double the legal requirement) 
have significant and sizeable marginal effects on the probability of ESO being in use.  It 
is notable that the marginal effects of the highest training category (4.1 per cent and 
above) remain more or less unchanged when the full range of controls are inserted.    
Similarly, the marginal effects of the relative level of investment in human capital on 
the probability of ESO being present are significant after the controls are inserted (the 
marginal effects of this variable when inserted alone are 0.197 (significant at the 1 per 
cent level) (Model 3).  However, there is no statistically significant relationship between 
the probability of ESO and the time required for employees to become fully operational 
(Model 4), contrary in particular to the results of Robinson and Zhang (2005). Although 
this  measure might be seen to be a useful measure of firm-specific human capital,  its 
limitation in this context is that it does not actually record whether the employer invests 
in training to develop appropriate employee skills and competencies.  Furthermore, the 
question ‘how long on average do you think it takes a beginner to  become fully 
operational (from an adequate initial level of training)?’ relates to the category of 
employees that are most numerous in the firm, not necessarily those that are the primary 
bearers of the human capital that generates competitive advantage.  Given this, our view 
is that training expenses is a better proxy of the firm’s investments in human capital, 
whether specific or general, because it records the level of financial resource that the 
firm actually invests in training.  These results are confirmed when training expenses 
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(or the relative level of investment in human capital) and time required to become fully 
operational are both included in the regression models (Models 4 and 5). Therefore the 
results recorded in Table 1 provide strong support for our first hypothesis that 
significant investments in training are associated with the presence of employee share 
ownership. 
  
In terms of controls, the evidence of linkages between ESO and direct employee 
involvement is mixed. ESO is significantly related to regular meetings with employees 
but, perhaps surprisingly, negatively associated with quality groups. Similarly, in the 
case of French firms, the presence of ESO is not associated with the presence of profit 
sharing schemes.  This is perhaps because profit sharing is so widespread amongst 
French listed firms whereas ESO is found only amongst a much smaller sub-set of 
companies.  A relatively high proportion of managers and professional workers is not 
significantly related to the probability of observing ESO: we experimented with an 
alternative measure (not shown) of the proportion of blue collar employees in the 
workforce but this is also insignificant in all models and makes very little change to 
model fit.  Unsurprisingly, given results elsewhere, the size of the company is positively 
associated with the presence of ESO: the larger the firm, the more likely it has ESO
i
.   
 
-------------- 
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Table 1 here 
-------------- 
 
Although significant training expenses in 2004 are associated with the presence of ESO 
in 2004, we cannot conclude on the basis of these results that training expenses are a 
cause of the use of ESO. However, we can investigate causality further by exploiting the 
panel element of the REPONSE dataset.  The use of data that provide information on 
establishments in 1998 and in 2004 allows us to introduce a temporal dimension into the 
study of the links between human capital and ESO. The second step of our analysis, 
therefore, is to analyse the lagged effect of training expenses of 1998 on the likelihood 
of ESO in 2004. As indicated earlier, the six year lag is viewed as a reasonable one 
given the time taken to establish an ESO scheme.  Table 2 reports the estimates of 
models 7 to 10 which, aside from the use of training variables from 1998, are otherwise 
identical to models 2, 3, 5 and 6 in Table 1.  A version of the Table 1, Model 4 is 
omitted because the key relationships of interest were found to be non-significant.   
-------------- 
Table 2 here 
-------------- 
 
29 
 
The pseudo-R² of the Table 2 models are somewhat superior to those of the first set of 
models (by around 5 percentage points), indicating that Models 7 to 1-0 explain the 
probability of ESO in 2004 better than when we use 2004 training expenses.  The 
estimates for the training expenses of 1998 and the relative level of investment in 
human capital are strongly significant with substantial marginal effects.  It is also worth 
noting that the marginal effects are somewhat larger than when the 1998 training 
expenses and relative level of investments in human capital are entered without controls 
(not shown).  These estimates are robust to the inclusion of the dummies for skills 
acquisition.  The marginal effects and significance of the controls are more or less the 
same as in Table 1, with quality circles (-), independent firm (+) and multi-site 
establishment (+) having notable and sizeable marginal effects.  Overall, the findings in 
Table 2 are supportive of the view that a high commitment to training in period 1 will 
be associated with the use of ESO in period 2.  But the workplaces with ESO in 2004 
may be of two sorts: 1) those establishments which had ESO in 1998 and continued to 
use it six years later, and 2) those which did not have ESO in 1998 and implemented it 
during the period     
 
To pinpoint the potential role of training expenses as an influence on the introduction of 
ESO, it is desirable to focus on the sub-set of establishments that implemented (or not) 
ESO between 1998 and 2004.  Two situations are possible for these establishments: 1) 
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there is ESO in neither 1998 nor 2004; 2) ESO is adopted between 1998 and 2004. 
Drawing on the methodology used by Kruse (1996), we run a set of adoption models to 
test our second hypothesis according to which significant investments in training 
precede the implementation of employee share ownership.  In these models, the sample 
is restricted to those establishments without ESO in 1998, thereby reducing the n by 24 
cases. 
 
-------------- 
Table 3 here 
-------------- 
In Table 3 the models for the adoption of ESO between 1998 and 2004 consider the role 
of training expenses in 1998, training expenses in 2004, and the combination of training 
expenses in both 1998 and 2004.    In Model 11 training expenses for 1998 are inserted 
whilst in Model 12, the relative level of investment in human capital is used.  Models 13 
and 14 repeat these two models using 2004 training investments.  Finally, Model 15 
captures movements in training expenses between 1998 and 2004.  Four categories are 
derived based on whether establishments had high (or low) relative levels of human 
capital investments in 1998 and 2004, with the sub-sample split at the median.    The 
results provide strong evidence of an association between high training investments in 
1998 and subsequent adoption of ESO.  There is a significant link between the adoption 
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of ESO and the importance of training expenses of 1998 (Models 11 and 12) but not 
with those of 2004 (Models 13 and 14).  When we examine movements in human 
capital investments, the results indicate that a continuing high level of investment has a 
significant relationship with the adoption of ESO.  A high level of training expenses in 
1998 and 2004 has sizeable and significant marginal effects on the probability of ESO 
being adopted by 2004, relative to those workplaces with low levels of training 
throughout.  An increase from a low level of training investment in 1998 to a high level 
in 2004 is, however, apparently insufficient to lead to the adoption of ESO.  It must be 
borne in mind that, as the data is based on two points in time, we do not know at what 
point the training investments increase.  If these investments increase only shortly 
before 2004 it is not surprising that the establishment has not yet implemented ESO.  
Although we cannot be certain of the precise temporal relationships, this insignificant 
result is broadly supportive of our contention that the time lag between the two points of 
observation is not inappropriate, bearing in mind the extended time taken for ESO to be 
implemented from initial managerial decision through shareholder approval to share 
allocations to employees. Where establishments reduce their training investment 
between 1998 and 2004 (ie. from high levels of training investments to low levels), the 
variable recording this has an insignificant relationship with the introduction of ESO.  
This is consistent with the argument that either training becomes less important to the 
establishment for whatever reason, or that training has been found to be ineffective and 
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hence is scaled-back by the establishment.  Either way, ESO is not necessary to 
reinforce training investments, and hence there is an insignificant relationship with the 
adoption of ESO.  Overall, these results are interesting because they show for the first 
time the importance of the temporal dimension to the relationship between investment 
in human capital and the implementation of ESO.  The results indicate that ESO is 
implemented where establishments make sustained efforts to invest in human capital.  
Hypothesis 2 is partially supported in that high levels of training investments precede 
the introduction of ESO but it needs to be refined to propose that these high levels need 
to be sustained over time for ESO to be adopted. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Investments in human capital are at the heart of a hold-up problem, in which the 
employer and the employees may attempt to capture rents generated from these 
investments. (Blair, 1995; Ben-Ner et al., 2000). This perspective draws on a broader 
literature on the ownership and boundaries of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Williamson, 1979) that, deriving from the seminar work of Ronald Coase (1937), 
highlights the role of opportunism and the boundaries to control where two or more 
parties share investments and these investments are worth more within the relationship 
between these parties than outside.  In recent years, this perspective has been drawn 
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upon to analyse employment relationships given that the assets of firms increasingly 
take a human or intangible rather than physical form (Blair, 1999; Rousseau and 
Sperling, 2003).  Employee ownership has been proposed as a means for resolving 
problems arising from the governance of and returns to human capital investments (see 
Pendleton and Robinson, 1999).  The role of ESO can be viewed as consistent with 
Grossman and Hart’s claim that there can be costs to control, in this case the allocation 
of control rights to owners.  ESO schemes, as considered in this paper, share ownership 
to a limited extent as a means of enhancing the returns to owners.  According to this 
theoretical perspective, employee share ownership should mitigate the potential ‘hold-
up’ problem and the costs of ownership, by aligning the interests of the firm and the 
employees, and by developing loyalty of the latter.   This view is also consistent with 
the implication of resource dependency theory that a solution to dependency is to co-opt 
important resource-holders (employees) into the dependent organisation (by sharing 
ownership rights).     
 
The financial participation literature has recently begun to operationalise these claims 
by considering relationships between training and the use of employee share ownership 
schemes.  However, whilst earlier work has been supportive it has lacked a longitudinal 
dimension.  (Ben-ner et al., 2000; Pendleton and Robinson, 2011; Robinson and Zhang, 
2005).  A contribution of this paper is that, by using panel data in REPONSE 1998 – 
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2004, the temporal dimension to this relationship is considered.  The important findings 
are that investments in training pre-date the implementation of ESO, that establishments 
do not implement ESO at the same time as they increase their investments in human 
capital, and that continuous investments in human capital are conducive to the adoption 
of ESO.  The lag between training investments and ESO adoption is consistent with the 
theoretical claims about the relationship between human capital investments and use of 
financial participation.  Support for this perspective also comes from a recent Canadian 
study of profit sharing which is also able to use a temporal dimension: the authors 
suggest that establishments with a high investment in human capital use profit sharing 
to share rents with employees (Fang and Long, 2012: 921).  
 
The results also make some broader contributions to the financial participation and 
HRM literatures.  Most studies of the factors associated with the use of financial 
participation take a cross-sectional form, and inevitably suffer from questions about the 
direction of causality.  Those studies that are able to consider adoption of schemes have 
tended to focus on profit sharing, and have tended to primarily use financial measures 
drawn from company accounts data (Carstensen et al., 1995; Kruse, 1993).  The results 
also contribute to the HRM literature on complementary practices.  Much of this 
literature draws on cross-sectional examinations of clusters of practices, and is unable to 
consider the dynamic aspects of complementarity (Pils and Macduffie, 1996).  The 
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temporal staging of complementarity observed in our study is supportive of the claim 
that organisations will tend to adopt the easier to use practices first. 
       
There are several possible explanations for this temporal difference.  The results are 
consistent with the view that establishments wait to see if their strategies of investment 
in human capital are effective. The implementation of ESO is a cumbersome and (in 
France) near-irreversible process, which generates a number of constraints for managers 
owing to the fact that employees become shareholders (if only in terms of distribution 
of information). This could explain why it is only when establishments invest in a 
significant and long-lasting way in human capital (and thus their performance become 
dependent on  human capital), that they decide to implement ESO in order to align 
interests and to retain employees.  The findings are consistent with the view from 
theories of evolutionary change that organisations adopt innovations in a piecemeal 
fashion and are slow to implement changes that revolutionise organisational routines.   
 
This paper inevitably has a number of limitations. Based on the theoretical background 
outlined above, it is claimed that employers fear that employers will capture the rents 
generated by enhancements to human capital. But, as we do not observe employees 
directly, we know very little about employee views.  More generally, future research 
should be conducted to examine what they expect from the firm in exchange for their 
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commitment to undergo training.  Furthermore, this research analyses the existence and 
the implementation of ESO but the use of dummies for ESO does not provide any 
information about the importance of the capital held by employees. This is important 
both in terms of the profits that employees can make (and thus the fact that ESO aligns 
more or less strongly the interest of the employer and the employees), that as regards 
the constraints for the employer (voting rights held by salaries). It would therefore be 
useful to have this information in future research. Finally survey data of this sort, used 
for secondary analysis, do not allow us to throw light on the question as to why and how 
decisions adopted by organizations are actually made. Implementation of ESO can be 
seen as a competitive and institutional isomorphism. As pointed out by Oliver (1997) 
’firms may mimic their rivals in the use of practices, they may react to coercive 
pressures to conform to legislation and informal rules, or they may uphold and follow 
certain normative employment practices and professionalization in the company and 
business in general’ (quoted in Poutsma et al., 2012: 1514). The question of intention 
must be asked. Do managers take a rational, considered decision to implement ESO in 
order to protect human capital, or are human capital investments and ESO ‘best 
practices’ that managers implement in a mimetic way without full consideration of the 
costs and benefits? Future research, perhaps conducted using case studies, should help 
to clarify this point. 
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In spite of these limitations, this paper provides new evidence highlighting that 
investments in human capital are associated with the use of employee share ownership.  
In so doing it enables us to better understand why organisations use employee share 
ownership.  As such the paper may generate benefits to policy-makers and company 
practitioners, as well as scholars of financial participation.  Clearly, the weight of recent 
evidence on this particular topic suggests that human capital-financial participations are 
a fruitful area for further consideration. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
error 
Employee Share  Ownership    
ESO 1998 Employees hold shares of the company in 
1998. (0,1) 
0.13 0.02 
ESO 2004 Employees hold shares of the company in 
2004. (0,1) 
0.35 0.03 
ESO neither in 1998 nor in 
2004 
Employees do not hold shares either in 1998 
or  2004. (0,1) 
0.65 0.03 
Implementation of ESO 
between 1998 and 2004 
Employees do not hold shares in 1998 but in 
2004 (0,1) 
0.23 0.03 
ESO in 1998 and in 2004 Employees hold shares in 1998 and in 2004 
(0,1) 
0.13 0.02 
Human capital    
1998 training expenses:    
lower than 1.5% of payroll The training expenses of the establishments in 
1998 are lower than 1.5% of payroll. (0,1) 
0.07 0.02 
between 1.5% and 2% of 
payroll 
The training expenses of the establishments in 
1998 are between 1.5 and 2% of payroll. (0,1) 
0.17 0.03 
between 2.1% and 3% of 
payroll 
The training expenses of the establishments in 
1998 are between 2.1% and 3% of payroll. 
(0,1) 
0.30 0.03 
 between 3.1% and 4% of 
payroll 
The training expenses of the establishments in 
1998 are between 3.1% and 4% of payroll. 
(0,1) 
0.16 0.03 
between 4.1% and 6% of 
payroll 
The training expenses of the establishments in 
1998 are between 4.1% and 6% of payroll. 
(0,1) 
0.22 0.03 
 higher than 6% of payroll The training expenses of the establishments in 
1998 are higher than 6% of payroll. (0,1) 
0.07 0.02 
1998 relative level of 
investment in human capital 
The training expenses of the establishment in 
1998 are higher than the median of the others 
establishments of the same industry. (0,1) 
0.48 0.04 
2004 training expenses:    
lower than 1.5% of payroll The training expenses of the establishments in 
2004 are lower than 1.5% of payroll. (0,1) 
0.04 0.01 
between 1.5% and 2% of 
payroll 
The training expenses of the establishments in 
2004 are between 1.5 and 2% of payroll. (0,1) 
0.21 0.03 
between 2.1% and 3% of 
payroll 
The training expenses of the establishments in 
2004 are between 2.1% and 3% of payroll. 
(0,1) 
0.28 0.03 
between 3.1% and 4% of 
payroll 
The training expenses of the establishments in 
2004 are between 3.1% and 4% of payroll. 
0.26 0.03 
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(0,1) 
between 4.1% and 6% of 
payroll 
The training expenses of the establishments in 
2004 are between 4.1% and 6% of payroll. 
(0,1) 
0.17 0.03 
higher than 6% of payroll The training expenses of the establishments in 
2004 are higher than 6% of payroll. (0,1) 
0.03 0.01 
2004 relative level of 
investment in human capital 
The training expenses of the establishment in 
2004 are higher than the median of the others 
establishments of the same industry. (0,1) 
0.52 0.04 
Evolution of the relative level of 
investment in human capital: 
   
Low level 1998 – Low level 
2004 
The training expenses are lower than the 
median of the others establishments of the 
same industry in 1998 and in 2004. (0,1) 
0.44 0.04 
Low level 1998 – High level 
2004 
The training expenses are lower than the 
median of the others establishments of the 
same industry in 1998 but higher in 2004. 
(0,1) 
0.16 0.03 
High level 1998 – High level 
2004 
The training expenses are higher than the 
median of the others establishments of the 
same industry in 1998 and in 2004. (0,1) 
0.26 0.03 
High level 1998 – Low level 
2004 
The training expenses are higher than the 
median of the others establishments of the 
same industry in 1998 but lower in 2004. (0,1) 
0.15 0.03 
Skills acquisition:    
 < 1 month A new employee needs less than 1 month to 
do his job as well as established employee. 
(0,1) 
0.14 0.02 
1-6 months A new employee needs between 1 and 6 
months to do his job as well as established 
employee. (0,1) 
0.54 0.04 
6 months -1 year A new employee needs between 6 months and 
1 year to do his job as well as established 
employee. (0,1) 
0.19 0.03 
> 1 year A new employee needs more than 1 year to do 
his job as well as established employee. (0,1) 
0.12 0.02 
Workforce and establishment controls 
Autonomy The work for the most numerous category of 
employees is defined by setting overall 
objectives. (0,1) 
0.31 0.03 
Quality circles The establishment uses of quality circle or 
similar. (0,1) 
0.65 0.04 
Briefing groups The establishment uses briefing groups. 
(0,1) 
0.28 0.03 
Regular meetings with 
employees 
There are regular team meetings. (0,1) 0.92 0.02 
Project teams Management seeks to encourage employee 
participation by sharing the business project 
0.48 0.04 
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with employees. (0/1) 
Profit-sharing There is a profit-sharing scheme in the 
establishment. (0/1) 
0.70 0.04 
% of fixed-term contracts Percentage of fixed-term contracts (%) 13.38 7.56 
Temporary employees The establishment employs temporary 
employees. (0/1) 
0.74 0.03 
Skills ratio Managers and engineers are the most 
numerous category of employees. (0/1) 
0.12 0.02 
Union representative There is at least one union representative in 
the firm. (0/1) 
0.91 0.02 
Size Natural logarithm of total number of 
employee of the firm (Ln) 
1.53 0.03 
Independent firm The firm is independent. (0/1) 0.07 0.02 
Multisite establishment The company has several establishments. 
(0/1) 
0.67 0.03 
Competition The flexibility of the establishment to set its 
sale price is low or zero. (0/1) 
0.37 0.03 
Industry The establishment operates in the industrial 
sector  (0/1) 
0.68 0.03 
Retail sector The establishment operates in the retail 
sector (0/1) 
0.09 0.02 
Transport sector The establishment operates in the transport 
sector (0/1) 
0.08 0.02 
Services sector The establishment operates in the services 
sector (0/1) 
0.15 0.03 
 
50 
 
Table 1. Effect of 2004 training expenses on 2004 ESO 
probit regression, reporting marginal effects  
 
 Probit (likelihood of ESO in 2004) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Training expenses lower than 2%  
of payroll 
Ref. Ref. .  Ref.  
Training expenses between 2.1%  
and 3% of payroll 
0.104 0.079   0.088  
Training expenses between 3.1%  
and 4% of payroll 
0.306*** 0.219*   0.222*  
Training expenses higher than  
4.1% of payroll 
0.270*** 0.265**   0.259*  
Relative level of investment in  
human capital 
  0.143*   0.142* 
Skills acquisition less < 1 month    Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Skills acquisition 1-6 months    0.030 0.015 0.025 
Skills acquisition 6 months -1 year    0.141 0.085 0.120 
Skills acquisition > 1 year    -0.018 -0.063 -0.046 
Autonomy  0.106 0.110 0.097 0.088 0.085 
Quality circles  -0.198** -0.181* -0.156* -0.190* -0.171* 
Briefing groups  0.145 0.137 0.099 0.137 0.127 
Regular meetings with employees  0.168 0.188* 0.224** 0.184 0.205* 
Project teams  0.097 0.091 0.111 0.104 0.099 
Profit-sharing  0.092 0.122 0.127 0.094 0.121 
% of employees on fixed-term 
contracts 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Temporary employees  0.102 0.091 0.089 0.088 0.073 
Skills ratio  0.104 0.089 0.113 0.124 0.037 
Union representative  0.028 0.036 0.025 0.002 -0.013 
Size  0.454*** 0.473*** 0.464*** 0.448*** 0.468*** 
Independent firm  0.325* 0.336* 0.354** 0.348* 0.362** 
Multisite establishment  0.076 0.070 0.087 0.085 0.080 
Competition   0.003 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.005 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R² 
N 
-120.24 
0.046 
185 
-88.549 
0.258 
185 
-89.788 
0.247 
185 
-90.707 
0.240 
185 
-88.051 
0.262 
185 
-89.105 
0.253 
185 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
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Table 2. Effect of 1998 training expenses on 2004 ESO 
probit regression, reporting marginal effects  
 
 Probit (likelihood of ESO in 2004) 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Training expenses lower than 2% of payroll Ref. . Ref.  
Training expenses between 2.1% and 3% of payroll 0.242*  0.239  
Training expenses between 3.1% and 4% of payroll 0.465***  0.471***  
Training expenses higher than 4% of payroll 0.460***  0.462***  
Relative level of investment in human capital  0.305***  0.313*** 
Skills acquisition less < 1 month   Ref. Ref. 
Skills acquisition 1-6 months   -0.031 0.015 
Skills acquisition 6 months -1 year   0.027 0.104 
Skills acquisition > 1 year   -0.109 -0.093 
Autonomy 0.118 0.110 0.103 0.087 
Quality circles -0.174** -0.226** -0.168* -0.216** 
Briefing groups 0.139 0.120* 0.136 0.114 
Regular meetings with employees 0.183* 0.212** 0.195* 0.226** 
Project teams 0.109 0.116 0.112 0.123 
Profit-sharing 0.114 0.138* 0.118 0.143* 
% of fixed-term contracts -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Temporary employees 0.112 0.114 0.102 0.094 
Skills ratio 0.053 -0.024 0.084 -0.056 
Union representative 0.017 -0.018 -0.012 -0.057 
Size 0.367** 0.393*** 0.355** 0.383** 
Independent firm 0.482** 0.393** 0.501*** 0.423** 
Multisite establishment 0.131 0.124 0.141 0.134 
Competition  0.069 0.074 0.060 0.066 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R² 
N 
-84.094 
0.295 
185 
-84.747 
0.290 
185 
-83.575 
0.299 
185 
-83.833 
0.297 
185 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
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Table 3. Relative investments in human capital and adoption of ESO  
probit regression, reporting marginal effects  
 
 Probit (likelihood of ESO in 2004) 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Training expenses lower than 2% of 
payroll (1998) 
Ref.      
Training expenses between 2.1% and 
3% of payroll (1998) 
0.223*     
Training expenses between 3.1% and 
4% of payroll (1998) 
0.440*     
Training expenses higher than 4% of 
payroll (1998) 
0.296**     
Relative level of investment in human 
capital 1998 
 0.201**    
Training expenses lower than 2% of 
payroll (2004) 
  Ref.   
Training expenses between 2.1% and 
3% of payroll (2004) 
  0.033   
Training expenses between 3.1% and 
4% of payroll (2004) 
  0.162   
Training expenses higher than 4% of 
payroll (2004) 
  0.156   
Relative level of investment in human 
capital 2004 
   0.110  
Relative level of investment in human 
capital: 
     
    Low level 1998 – Low level 2004     Ref. 
    Low level 1998 – High level 2004 
    High level 1998 – High level 2004 
    High level 1998 – Low level 2004 
    0.057 
0.265** 
0.192 
Skills acquisition less < 1 month Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Skills acquisition 1-6 months -0.002 0.027 0.004 0.020 0.030 
Skills acquisition 6 months -1 year 0.097 0.151 0.127 0.152 0.144 
Skills acquisition > 1 year -0.046 -0.025 -0.019 -0.004 -0.026 
Autonomy 0.136 0.111 0.109 0.113 0.110 
Quality circles -0.101 -0.153* -0.130 -0.121 -0.157* 
Briefing groups 0.108 0.081 0.105 0.103 0.092 
Regular meetings with employees 0.104 0.133* 0.097 0.106 0.124 
Project teams 0.098 0.105 0.079 0.082 0.098 
Profit-sharing 0.118* 0.141** 0.122* 0.132** 0.140** 
% of fixed-term contracts -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Temporary employees 0.109 0.097 0.092 0.086 0.092 
Skills ratio 0.076 0.021 0.064 0.046 0.021 
Union representative -0.020 -0.071 -0.046 -0.039 -0.077 
Size 0.196 0.239* 0.278** 0.289** 0.251** 
Independent firm 0.573*** 0.450** 0.400** 0.414** 0.444** 
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Multisite establishment 0.062 0.059 0.017 0.018 0.046 
Competition  0.113 0.115 0.073 0.079 0.115 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R² 
N 
-65.062 
0.279 
161 
-65.937 
0.269 
161 
-67.422 
0.253 
161 
-67.950 
0.247 
161 
-65.637 
0.273 
161 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
i
 In a set of models not reported here, we also test whether financial performance has any relationship 
with the use of ESO.  The results are never significant at p<0.05.  These results are not reported in the 
paper because there is some sample attrition when the financial performance variable is included. 
